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Abstract:
At the Uruguay Round, developing countries took on unprecedented obligations
not only to reduce trade barriers, but to implement significant reforms both of trade
procedures, e.g., import licensing procedures, customs valuation, and of many areas of
regulation that establish the basic business environment in the domestic economy, e.g.,
technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, intellectual property law. Implementing
such reforms are investment decisions in that implementation will require purchase of
equipment, training of people, establishment of systems of checks and balances, etc. This
will cost money, and the amounts of money involved are substantial. Based on Bank
project experience in the areas covered by the agreements, an entire year's development
budget is at stake in many of the least developed countries.
Least developed country institutions in these areas are weak, and would benefit
from strengthening and reform. However, our analysis indicates that the WTO
obligations reflect little awareness of development problems and little appreciation for
the capacities of least developed countries to carry out the functions that SPS, customs
valuation, intellectual property, etc. regulations address. The content of these obligations
can be characterized as the advanced countries saying to the others, Do it my way!
We touch at the beginning on another important point. Because of their limited
capacity to participate in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the WTO process has
generated no sense of  "ownership" of the reforms to which WTO membership obligates
them. From their perspective, the implementation exercise has been imposed in an
imperial way, with little concern for what it will cost, how it will be done, or if it will
support their development efforts.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Many developing countries have successfully used international trade as a vehicle
for development.  A number of others however have been left behind. The WTO
Ministerial Declarations of 1996 and of 1998 expressed concern over this
"marginalization" of "least-developed countries and certain small economies" in the
international trading system and asked the international community to make a particular
effort to help them to take advantage of opportunities offered by the international trading
system.
At the Uruguay Round, developing countries took on unprecedented obligations
not only to reduce trade barriers, but to implement significant reforms both on trade
procedures (e.g., import licensing procedures, customs valuation) and on many areas of
regulation that establish the basic business environment in the domestic economy (e.g.,
technical, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, intellectual property law).
This paper is about the latter comnmitments.  We point out that they are investment
decisions in that implementation will require purchasing of equipment, training of people,
establishment of systems of checks and balances, etc.  This will cost money and the
amounts of money involved are substantial.  Based on Bank project experience in the
areas covered by the agreements, an entire year's development budget is at stake in many
of the least developed countries.
Least developed country institutions in these areas are weak, and would benefit
from strengthening and reform. However, our analysis indicates that the WTO
obligations reflect little awareness of development problems and little appreciation of the
capacities of the least developed countries to carry out the functions that SPS, customs
valuation, intellectual property, etc. regulations address.
We touch at the beginning on another important point.  Because of their limited
capacity to participate in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the WTO process has
generated no sense of "ownership" of the reforms to which WTO membership obligates
them. From their perspective, the implementation exercise has been imposed in an
imperial way, with little concern for what it will cost, how it will be done, or if it will
support their development efforts.'
We do not present this perspective as a reason to avoid implementation. The countries would be worse
off without reform. We provide it instead as a guide to where help is needed to make implementation
effective in the countries that as of now have no sense of ownership of the WTO system.
1WHOM WE ARE TALKING ABOUT
As to the developing countries we have in mind, like the WTO Ministers in their
1996 Declaration, our concern focuses on the countries that are being marginalized.
What we will argue will apply particularly to these countries - generally, the least
developed countries - rather than to those developing countries that have already
established themselves as major trading economies and active members of the WTO
diplomatic community. Throughout the paper we will use the term, "least developed
countries," to refer to all countries that are struggling to use the international trading
system effectively - a list of countries approximated by the United Nations official list of
least developed countries, but not necessarily identical to that list.2
WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT
Our analysis is based on World Bank project experience in customs reforrn, SPS,
and intellectual property regulation.  In each of these areas we reviewed Bank experience
with three questions in mind:
1.  What are the development problems in this area?
2.  Does the WTO agreement correctly diagnose the development problems?
3.  Does the WTO agreement prescribe an appropriate remedy?
"Appropriate" in the third question refers both to correct identification of the
problem and to recognition of the capacities (resource constraints) of the least developed
countries. 3
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
In the next section we will explain how implementation of such obligations differs
from implementation of more traditional market access conmuitments  such as tariff
reduction or elimination of quantitative restrictions.  In sections 3 and 4 we look briefly at
least developed countries' participation in the Uruguay Round negotiations.  In section 3
we point out that this participation, or lack thereof, has left these countries with no sense
of ownership of the commitments they have undertaken.  In section 4 we point out that in
the Uruguay Round market access negotiations, the developing countries received no
more than they gave - this in response to the possible criticism that implementation of the
reforms we review here is what the developing countries owe for what they received in
the market access negotiations.  Sections 5, 6 and 7 present our examination of the
challenges developing countries will face in implementing their obligations on customs
valuation, sanitary and phytosanitary standards and intellectual property regulation.  In
each area we outline basic WTO obligations and we examine how implementation might
be managed so that it best helps the least developed countries to use trade as a vehicle for
development.  Our conclusions are in the final section.
2.  THE SCOPE  OF "IMPLEMENTATION"
2 Like the WTO Ministers, we offer no precise list of the countries who share the problems we address.
3To  take a brisk 30-minute walk every day would not be a good prescription for a paraplegic.
2The initial focus of the GATT was to remove bad policies: the excess of trade
restrictions that built up during the world recession of the 1930s and the war years of the
1940s. While considerable political courage and diplomatic skill were needed to make
the necessary decisions, implementing them, e.g., changing the tariff rates, required no
more than the stroke of a minister's or a legislature's pen.  A lot of money will flow in
different directions because of tariff cuts, but it costs nothing to cut the tariffs.
More is involved in the implementation of WTO rules on customs valuation,
intellectual property rights and SPS than the simple removal of bad policies.
Implementation is about creating infrastructure, about creating the institutions that
facilitate economic activity.  Intellectual property rights implementation, for example,
will, like tariff reductions, cause money to flow in different directions.  But it costs
money to implement IPR. Implementation involves investment: purchase and installation
of equipment and procedures, training of staff, etc.
To provide specificity to this point and to provide an indication of the scope and
cost of investments that may be involved in implementing Uruguay Round commitments,
we will review (primarily) World Bank experience with customs reform, with application
of sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and with installation of systems of intellectual
property rights.  One of the lessons that emerges from this review is that the scope of
what the WTO regulates is narrower than the scope of what must be done to make
development sense out of implementation.  For example customs valuation versus
customs reform - it helps little to change customs valuation procedures if containers still
stay on the dock for 60 days.
3.  THE URUGUAY ROUND GENERATED
NO LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRY "OWNERSHIP"
OF THE RULES
"Ownership" of the rules is an important element in the functioning of any system
of rules; particularly important in systems such as the WTO, where the central
organization has limited power to enforce.  Building among members a solid sense of
ownership of such rules begins with participation in establishing them - for WTO rules,
with effective participation in the WTO negotiations in which the rules were agreed.
The African Economic Research Consortium has conducted an evaluation of sub-
Saharan African countries' participation in the rules making exercises of the Uruguay
Round and has found that this participation was minimal.  These countries lacked the
capacity to engage substantively on the wide range of issues that the Uruguay Round
included.  The AERC evaluation identified weaknesses at three levels:
1.  Geneva delegations were small and lacked persons with the technical backgrounds
needed to participate effectively.  A competent diplomat without the backing of a
technical staff was not an effective delegation. 4
4 Of  65 developing  country  GATT/WTO  members  when  the Uruguay  Round  began,  20 did not have
delegations  in Geneva. Of the 20, 15  were represented  from  embassies  in other  European  cities,  and 5
by delegations based in their national capitals.  Furthermore, developing country delegations were
notably  smaller  than those  of the industrial  countries. In 1987,  when  the Uruguay  Round  began,  the
32.  Links between WTO delegations and the government at home were not developed.
There was a lack of established process to involve the relevant ministries with issues
that were being negotiated in Geneva, e.g., health and agriculture ministries with
negotiations on sanitary and phytosanitary standards, the customs agency with the
customs valuation negotiations.
3.  Stakeholders, e.g., the business community, were minimally involved.
An indicator of the lack of involvement by sub-Saharan countries is that, of all the
written proposals, comments, etc. circulated at the WTO during the Uruguay Round
negotiations, less than 3 percent were submitted by sub-Saharan countries. 5 These
delegations' efforts in the Uruguay Round were principally aimed at defending special
and differential treatment:
*  on rules, that different rules should apply to countries at different stages of
development - phased-in implementation became an eventual rendition;
*  on market access, to defend preferences that sub-Saharan countries enjoyed. 6
Ogunkola concludes that "[w]hile the participation of Africa has been limited by
the capacity to negotiate, the ratification of the agreement and the single undertaking
clause made the implementation of the agreement almost non-negotiable. 7"
The reasoning behind this point:
*  The alternative available at the end of the Tokyo Round - to sign some agreements
but not others - was taken away.
*  Countries that chose to remain GATT members but opted not to accept the Uruguay
Round package that was incumbent on WTO members would have been
discriminated against - they would not be owed the new obligations that WTO
members accepted at the Uruguay Round. 8
EU had in Geneva a delegation of 10, EU Member States' delegations included an additional 57
persons. The US delegation numbered 10, the Japanese, 15. Only 12 developing countries had
delegations of more than three persons. The larger ones: Korea, Mexico and Tanzania, 7 each; Brazil
and Indonesia, 6 each; Thailand, Hong Kong and Egypt, 5 each.  Of the 48 least developed countries,
29 are WTO members, but only 11 of these maintain delegations in Geneva.  As of January 1999, 6




7 "Single undertaking" here means that each member was expected to take on all obligations, that the codes
approach of the Tokyo Round, in which each member could opt to sign some codes and not sign
others, was not available.  John Croome, who served in the GATT/WTO Secretariat throughout the
Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, has pointed out in correspondence that "single undertaking" initially
referred to the members voting on all parts of the agreement as a whole, i.e., that the outcome of the
tariff negotiations would not be put up for approval separately from the outcome of the subsidies
negotiations.  As the negotiations progressed, the meaning of "single undertaking" expanded to
include the "no country can opt out of any part" meaning.
8Because  the Tokyo Round codes were part of the GATT, the GATT nondiscrimination obligation (Article
I) required that code signatories apply the codes in their dealings with non-signatories as with
signatories, i.e., non-signatories were entitled to the benefits of a code without accepting the
obligations.
4*  To the negotiators, the diplomatic value of becoming a WTO member weighed
heavily.
Result: there came forward in these countries no sense of ownership of the
implied reforms.  To least developed country negotiators, the reforms were imposed by
the major trading countries.  The government agencies that must implement the rules
blame the large countries and their own negotiators. To them, the rules were imposed by
the major trading countries over the weakness of their own negotiators.  Among
stakeholders, the losers have been agitated, e.g., interests that previously secured
protection from the application of customs procedures, or standards.  But the process of
making the rules has not rallied the potential winners, e.g., traders who would save
money from improved customs operations, producers who might be able to export if
standards were upgraded to an international level.  Given these attitudes, it is difficult to
rally support for implementation.  At each level, implementation is viewed as something
that will help someone else, 9 the urge is to do the minimum to get by.  Attempts to force
implementation through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism would likely reinforce
the impression that the WTO rules are imperially imposed from the outside, for the
benefit of the outside.
TRIPS, the customs valuation agreement, the SPS agreement and several others
suggest that developed country members furnish technical assistance to developing
country members that so request it. This provision however is not a binding
commitment; in effect, the developing countries have taken on bound commitments to
implement in exchange for unbound commitments of assistance to implement.
4.  IMPLEMENTATION  OF RULES VS. MARKET  ACCESS:
WHAT THEY GAVE FOR WHAT THEY  GOT?
Implementation of these rules, some have argued, is what the developing
countries owe for the Uruguay Round market access concessions they got from the
industrial countries, particularly in agriculture, textiles and clothing.
One can respond to this assertion in several ways. First of all, it does not nullify
the ownership argument above. Even if, in the mercantilist ethic of the GATT/WTO, the
least developed countries owe this implementation, we still have the ownership
problem-the  process by which these obligations were taken on has not helped to build
the domestic politics to implement them.
Second, what the industrial countries gave in agriculture and in textiles-clothing is
still more a promise than a reality. In Annex A where we summarize an earlier review of
the Uruguay Round market access negotiations, we report that in textiles-clothing, the
industrial countries have committed themselves to liberalization, but with delayed
delivery.  The details of the textiles-clothing agreement, we document, will allow the
industrial countries to delay almost all of the removal of MFA-sanctioned quantitative
restrictions until 2005.  In agriculture, the agreed change of form of protection from
9  An African food scientist remarked to me in conversation, 'They  want us to adopt the SPS agreement so
that we will import more chickens from them."
5NTBs to tariffs has been implemented, but reduction of protection is still to be agreed.
The industrial countries at the Uruguay Round reduced the level of protection on a
smaller percentage of their agricultural imports than of their industrial imports, and tariffs
on agricultural products remain significantly higher than those on industrial goods.
Agriculture is part of the "built-in agenda" - the Uruguay Round agreement includes a
provision to undertake in 2000 further negotiations on agriculture protection.  These
however will be negotiations, in which countries that agree to concessions will expect
reciprocal concessions.  Unlike in the textiles-clothing agreement, there is no bound
commitment in the agriculture agreement to implement future liberalization.
A final and perhaps the major point here, in the tariff negotiations developing
economies' tariff cuts covered the same percentage of imports as industrial country cuts,
and developing country cuts were actually deeper.  Within the mercantilist calculus of
concession-for-concession, the developing countries received no surplus in the market
access negotiations that they should feel obligated to pay back in the rules negotiations.
5.  CUSTOMS VALUATION
Article VII, the GATT article on customs valuation, provides that, in principle,
customs value should be based on actual value.  Actual value, in turn, is to be based on
the price at which the product or like merchandise is sold under competitive conditions in
the ordinary course of trade.
Under Article VII, a number of different valuation practices were accepted, e.g.,
basing customs valuation on the price of competing domestic products.
The Uruguay Round Customs Valuation Agreement establishes the transactions
value of the shipment in question as the primary basis for customs value.  Supporters of
the agreement see it bringing two improvements:
1.  Increased predictability for traders - they will be able to calculate before-hand their
customs liability,
2.  Control over the use of inflated customs values to restrict imports.
We will point out in this section that customs valuation is only one part of the
customs process.  Given the initial situation in many least developed countries (which we
will briefly characterize) changing the valuation process without overall customs reform
is not likely to improve the predictability of the customs process, nor would it mitigate
significantly the possibility of using the customs process as a non-tariff barrier.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' CUSTOMS PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS
Customs practices in many least developed countries differ significantly from
those in place in the more advanced trading nations. The differences are often
differences in basic concept, not just differences of detail or efficiency.
6Use of reference prices
Traders can evade exchange controls by overvaluing import shipments; they can
evade customs duties and excise taxes applied at the border by undervaluing shipments.
Rather than establishing the control and information systems necessary to identify actual
transaction value, many governments have based customs value on schedules of reference
prices, reference prices based sometimes on domestic prices (e.g., those established by
local producers associations) on prices in major exporting countries, or on more abstract
minimum or normal values. Use of such reference prices effectively converts ad valorem
rates into specific rates (e.g., a tariff with two columns-ad  valorem rate, unit value).
While inflating reference prices does provide a means for providing protection for
domestic production, overstatement and unpredictability are not intrinsic features of such
valuation systems, nor is discretionary application by customs administrators. Reference
prices can be publicly posted, and international prices (at least for commodities) can
provide an objective standard for establishing their value.
Physical Control
Effective customs administration has both physical and administrative
dimensions. Physical control is about keeping track of what passes into and out of the
country.  In many poorer countries, traditional smuggling-goods  sneaked across the
border away from recognized ports-is  a significant problem. At a duty rate of 50%, the
duty on the number of televisions one person can transport on a bicycle-jitney can come,
in a poor country, to a year's wages. Where physical control systems are poor,
smuggling need not involve clandestine overland trails or secret moonlit beaches.  Goods
often move through ports without coming under the supervision of customs authorities.
Administrative Processes
Customs processes in poorer countries exhibit many interacting weaknesses-
excessive procedures (re international guidelines) that are not codified, poorly trained
officials, a civil service system that does not pay a living wage and depends on officials
receiving side-payments for performing their functions, ineffective provision for appeal.
Bert Cunningham, in an assessment of several least developed countries
considering customs reform, observed that systems and procedures appeared to have
evolved to maximize the number of steps and approvals - to create as many opportunities
as possible for negotiation between traders and customs officials.  Procedures were not
codified, not even a schedule of current tariff rates was available.  There was thus no
objective basis for limiting what an official might demand, no basis for a trader to know
what was expected at each step, and no basis for appeal to a higher authority that he/she
had satisfied requirements, even if there had been provision for such appeal.  Internal
operational audit was impossible, there was no possibility of, much less incentive for,
voluntary compliance.
It should be evident from this introduction to customs problems in poorer
countries that valuation is only an inch in the whole yard of customs operations that need
improvement.
7REFORM EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES
We present in this section a review of customs reform projects in several
countries. This review reinforces one of the arguments we made in the previous section,
that needed reform is much broader than valuation reform. The section in addition
provides information on how much customs reform costs.
Tanzania
Customs consultant Bert Cunningham prepared a report to the Tanzanian Revenue
Authority proposing a comprehensive reform of Tanzanian customs procedures.10
Cost. $8-10 million over three years.  This would cover technical assistance,
training, refurbishment of buildings, new equipment, and computerization.
Scope.  The reform proposal includes:
*  Computerization - including ASYCUDA (the UNCTAD computerized customs
system), and systems for warehouse inventory control, and statistical reporting.
*  Valuation procedures -phase out the Brussels Definition of and adopt the WTO
system (based on transaction prices).
*  Cargo controls - speed up processing and eliminate fraudulent or incorrect valuation.
*  Building refurbishment - refurbish customs buildings necessary to house ASYCUDA.
*  Administrative reforms - establish a new division responsible for customs valuation
and tariff classification, recruit and train staff, establish appeals tribunal, reduce
discretion exercised by customs officers.
*  Screenings  for drug interdiction.
*  Legislative reforms - rewrite laws, formally accede to the Harmonized System
Convention, increase transparency.
Central and Eastern Europe
The European Union has been assisting ten of the formerly socialist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe with institutional reforms through its Phare Program.
Cost. 1" The total budget allocated for Phare customs modernization in the ten
candidate countries is 90 million ecus for 1990-97, of which 70 million has been






Total Contracted (million ecus)  70.25
'°Bert Cunningham, "Tanzania: Strategy and Action Plan to Reform Customs Administration," June 1996.
l  Pricewaterhouse Coopers, "Evaluation of the DG IA Programmes: Phare Customs Programmes,"
December 1998. URL: http://europa.eu.indcommdg1a/evaluation/phare  customs/index.htm
[Accessed June 16, 1999.]
8Scope.
*  Computerization - Establish computerized customs declarations systems in all
countries.
*  Anti-Smuggling Equipment - Provide laboratory and detection equipment for drug
interdiction and other anti-smuggling efforts.  Equipment ranges from x-ray
equipment and gas chromatographs to communications equipment.
*  Management and Staff Training - Train staff in basic management, customs
procedures and computer operations; establish staff training schools.
*  Legal Reforms  - EU candidates must adopt the EU customs code.  Phare assistance
funded translation of laws, training to (re-)write laws in conformance with EU codes,
and conduct public information campaigns.
World Bank Projects
A number of World Bank projects contain components assisting countries with
customs reform through staff training and modernizing customs procedures.  These
customs reform components are designed to support the projects' broader development
objectives (such as increasing export capacity or fiscal reform). Below are three
examples.
Country  Project description  Cost
Armenia, 1993-1997  Draft new customs law, train staff, and  $1.604 million
computerize procedures - component of
an institution building project
Lebanon, 1994-2001  Train staff, introduce new tariff  $3.82 million
classification, computerize procedures -
component of a revenue enhancement
and fiscal management project
Tunisia, 1999-2004  Computerize and simplify procedures - $16.21 million
component of an export development
project
To sum up this section, the reforms we have reviewed cover some sixteen major
categories of activities ranging from rewriting legislation through training in auditing
procedures, physical security in customs warehouses, to policing of smuggling and of
traffic in illicit drugs. Various of these components involve a cost in the neighborhood of
$10 million per country.
VALUATION UNDER THE WTO CUSTOMS VALUATION AGREEMENT
Not only does the Uruguay Round customs valuation agreement address only a
part of the customs process, the valuation process it prescribes presumes an
administrative environment that does not exist in many of the least developed countries.
9Key elements in the agreement
The agreement prescribes a hierarchy of valuation methods.
1.  Transaction value of the imported merchandise - the price actually paid or payable
for the specific shipment. The agreement provides a list of items (add-ins) that must
be included in the price actually paid or payable, e.g., packing costs, cost of tools,
dies and moulds provided by the buyer.  The agreement permits tariffs to be based on
either c.i.f. or f.o.b. values.  National law must specify which, a country's practice can
not vary from shipment to shipment.
2.  Transaction value of identical merchandise - sold for export to the same country of
importation at or about the same time - for which a transaction value can be
determined.
3.  Transaction value of similar merchandise. Add-ins and take-outs adjust for the
merchandise not being identical to the merchandise in the shipment in question.
4.  Deductive value based on the price at which the merchandise or identical or similar
merchandise is sold in the importing country to an unrelated buyer.  Appropriate add-
ins and take-outs are to be applied, particularly if the merchandise has received
further processing, been divided into smaller lots, etc., before it is re-sold.
5.  Computed value - adding various prescribed amounts (profits, expenses, transport) to
the cost of production (materials, fabricating, processing).  This method depends on
the seller being willing to supply the necessary costing.  The agreement allows the
importer discretion to specify that the computed value method be applied before the
deductive value method.  Developing countries do not have to apply the computed
value method before January 1, 2002.
The agreement also provides a rogue's gallery of methods that may not be used:
*  Selling price of competing domestic products,
*  Choice of the higher value when two alternative values are available,
*  Use of the selling price on the market of the exporting country or on another export
market,
*  Use of production costs except if computing according to the fifth method,
*  The price of goods for export to a country other than the country of importation,
*  Minimum values,
*  Other arbitrary or fictitious values.
The agreement provides that upon written request the importer has the right to a
written explanation as to how customs value was determined.  The agreement also
explicitly states that nothing in it may be interpreted as restricting the authority of
customs officials to satisfy themselves that statements or documents presented are true
and accurate. It also requires that national legislation provide for the right of appeal
without penalty.
Presumed administrative environment
The valuation process the Uruguay Round agreement imposes is one that
complements customs systems in place in most of the advanced trading nations
(including both developing and industrial countries). That system is based on generalized
10use of electronic information management and built-in incentives for self-compliance.
Trade in these countries takes place in large-scale lots and duty rates are generally low.
In this context, departure from routine business practice is costly, e.g., retrieving
additional information in response to a valuation inquiry. Importers normally conduct the
valuation process themselves, including application of the add-ins and take-outs needed
to comply with the rules.  In Norway, a paperless customs declaration system operates
around-the-clock, average clearance takes 15 minutes. About 85 percent of declarations
pass through the system without being stopped for further investigation. 12
Enforcement is risk based and involves random selection of entries that will be
checked.  That selection is grounded in the customs office's record of compliance by the
traders. For example, in Mexico, 90 percent of shipments receive the "green light"
overall, but historic information affects the probability of the light flashing red for any
shipment.
Questioning and verification of the importer-submitted customs value does not
normally cause physical delay of the shipment.  Instead, the importer posts a customs
bond sufficient to cover the amount in question. Financial institutions in many least
developed countries do not offer such bonds.
SUPPORTING REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Colleagues at the Bank who proudly point out that "their" countries have
eliminated all quantitative restrictions and have tariff rates at intermediate levels often
admit that customs administration is a mess.  Reform is needed in many least developed
countries. The Uruguay Round Agreement does not prescribe changes particularly suited
to the problems and to the administrative environments that exist in these countries;
however, it does allow leeway for development and adoption of such reforms.  We
review in this subsection the relevant provisions of the agreement, and we suggest
guidelines for reforms.
Customs valuation agreement provisions aimed particularly at developing
countries' concerns
The agreement and its annexes.  The customs valuation agreement provides for
delayed application by developing countries, those who were not signatories to the Tokyo
Round customs valuation code have until January 1, 2000.13 As noted above, such
countries can take an additional three years before they implement the constructed value
method of valuation.  Annex III to the agreement acknowledges that the five-year delay
in implementation may not be sufficient for certain developing countries, and provides
for a developing country to apply for an extension of the deadline (no length is specified)
"it being understood that Members will give sympathetic consideration to such a request
in cases where the developing country Member in question can show good cause."
12  WCO 1999.
13 The Tokyo Round customs valuation code went into effect in 1990, hence at the time the Uruguay
Round agreement went into effect the industrial countries had 15 years' experience with
implementing basically the same requirements.
11Annex III also provides that "Developing countries which currently value goods
on the basis of officially established minimum values may wish to make a reservation to
enable them to retain such values on a limited and transitional basis under such terms and
conditions as may be agreed to by the Members."
Ministerial Decisions.  In addition to the article on special and differential
treatment and the annex cited just above, two Ministerial Decisions taken at the time of
approval of the Uruguay Round Agreements addresses developing country concerns
about customs valuation.
One of the addressed concerns was that the agreement would not give developing
countries sufficient room to challenge traders whom they believed to be under-invoicing.
The chief provisions of the relevant Ministerial Decision are that where customs
administrators have reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of declared value:
*  The customs administrator may ask the importer to provide further information,
documents, etc.
*  If with such information or lack of response customs still has reasonable doubt about
the truth or accuracy of the declared value, it may conclude that value cannot be
determined by the first method.
*  Before taking such a decision, customs shall communicate to the importer, in writing
if requested, its grounds for doubting, and give the importer reasonable opportunity to
respond.
*  Customs must communicate its final decision in writing to the importer.
Another Ministerial Decision states that "sympathetic consideration" will be
given to developing country requests to extend the period of application of officially
established minimum prices.  In regard to developing country concerns that they would
have trouble valuing imports by sole agents, sole distributors and sole concessionaires,
the Ministerial decided that the Customs Cooperation Council would assist them in
conducting appropriate studies.
Characteristics that reform steps should introduce
Reform should aim to build into a customs system the following characteristics:
*  transparency, including codified procedures and codified criteria for determinations;
*  objectivity, decisions based on verifiable facts rather than on the discretion of
administrators;
*  accountability;
*  balance, equal access to the process by all stakeholders.
Possible building blocks
Among international organizations, the World Customs Organization has perhaps
the greatest capacity to guide overall customs reform. The WCO's  Kyoto Convention
(officially, the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of
Customs Procedures) and various WCO conventions on single topics attempt to codify
good practice across the range of activities that make up the entirety of customs
administration.  The WCO Secretariat has an active program to work with governments
12to identify weaknesses in their customs procedures and to develop concrete plans for
reform.
The authors of this paper have little experience with customs administration. Our
objective here is limited to suggesting that the international community pay attention to
how customs administration might be built up a step at a time in the least developed
countries, and to offer a suggestion or two that might begin such a discussion. Besides
the technical questions of what to do and how to do it, there is also the political need to
see that the process is demand driven, to generate ownership in such reforms among the
stakeholders in the least developed countries.
Where tariffs are high, and where accounting expertise and access to electronic
information limited, shifting to a risk-based valuation system that depends on in-depth
examination of a sample (15 or 20 percent) of shipments, might increase rather than
reduce the number of shipments on which importers attempt to under-invoice.  Traders
might view the change as giving them a better, not a worse chance to get away with
under-invoicing.
At least for basic goods, a valuation system based on observed world prices might
offer a better opportunity to introduce transparency, objectivity and accountability into
the system. At periodic reviews of these "reference prices," both import users and
import-competing interests might be given "standing;" and could be offered the
opportunity to submit evidence in support of revisions.  It might also be possible to
establish a collective system of reference prices, over which no one government had
control.  Schedules of reference prices might be determined by an intergovernmental
group, their preparation and circulation might be contracted to an independent agency.
6.  SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY STANDARDS
WTO treatment of sanitary and phytosanitary standards illustrates the expansion
of WTO coverage from border measures to the trade dimensions of policies often thought
of as domestic policies.  GATT Article XX recognizes the right of governments to restrict
trade when necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, provided that the
measures:
*  are not applied in a manner which unjustifiably discriminates between countries with
the same conditions,
*  are not applied as a disguised restriction on trade.
Concerns that removal of traditional restrictions on imports of agriculture
products would tempt countries to use SPS in a restrictive way prompted the SPS
agreement. The aim of the agreement is to keep to a minimum the trade effects of
government actions to ensure the safety of food and the protection of human, animal and
plant health.
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE AGREEMENT
The WTO SPS agreement covers all measures taken:
*  to protect human, animal and plant health from pests and diseases,
13*  to protect human and animal health from risks in food or foodstuffs (such as toxins or
pesticide residues)
*  to protect humans from animal-carried diseases such as rabies.
As GATT Article XX, the Agreement recognizes the right of governments to take
such measures but provides greater detail on both what to do and what not to do.14 hI
concept it constrains a country to use SPS measures:
*  only to the extent necessary to protect life or health,
*  based on scientific principles,
*  not maintained if scientific evidence is lacking.
The latter bullet implies that SPS measures can be put in place only on the basis
of careful laboratory testing and analysis and if science-based concerns about food safety
or serious threats to animal or plant health have been identified.
Clout for exporters
As the customs valuation agreement is intended to prevent valuation from being
used in a protectionist way, the SPS agreement is intended to limit the use of SPS
measures to restrict imports.  Before the SPS agreement was in force, an exporter had to
comply with the importing country's SPS measures. With the agreement in force, the
exporter must still comply with the importing country's SPS measures, but the importing
country is, by the agreement, required to demonstrate that its SPS measures are in fact
based on science and are applied equally to domestic and foreign producers.  The
Uruguay Round agreement puts the WTO on the side of those exporters who do comply.
The exporter now has clearer grounds for challenging an import restriction.
On imports, a heavier burden for developing countries
While the SPS agreement does not require that a country's  domestic standards
meet the agreement's requirements, it does require that the standards the country applies
at the border meet those requirements. In this regard, the agreement likely places a
heavier burden on developing than on industrial countries - this resulting from the
standards already in place in the industrial countries more-or-less being established as the
standard to which the developing countries must comply.
The agreement specifies that SPS measures in conformity with relevant
international conventions 15 are to be deemed necessary to  rotect human, animal or plant
health, and presumed consistent with the SPS agreement.  Industrial countries have
been leaders in establishing these international conventions, the resulting conventions
4 The WTO SPS agreement requires that the process of developing and enforcing these laws be
transparent. Governments must publish proposed regulations in advance and allow public comment,
including from foreign exporters. Governments must notify the relevant international body (see
following footnote) of any changes to SPS rules and must establish Enquiry Points so that trading
partners can determine a country's present and planned SPS regulations and processes.
'5  The SPS agreement specifically recognizes the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office
of Epizootics and the International Plant Protection Convention, including subsidiary, regional, etc.
parts thereof.
16 Article 3.
14being in significant part generalizations of industrial country practices and standards.!7
This does not imply that such standards are bad standards in a scientific sense nor that
they are biased standards in an economic sense. It does however imply that the SPS
agreement provides for a more effective assault against current developing countries' use
of SPS measures against imports than against industrial countries' use.  As a least
developed country health official remarked, "They want us to adopt the SPS agreement
so that we will import more chickens from them."
APPLICATION REQUIRES INVESTMENT
For a developing country to effectively use the WTO agreement to defend its
export rights or to justify its import restrictions, it will have to upgrade its SPS system to
international standards.  This necessity does not question that such upgrading would
serve the development objectives of the country. Our point again is that for the
developing countries, effective use of the WTO agreement depends on extensive
investments - it is not a matter of applying existing systems of standards to international
trade, it is a much broader matter of installing world-class systems.  The following sub-
section documents this contention.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE
The World Bank has assisted many countries to implement sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations.  Bank projects supporting SPS systems have typically placed
these measures in a general development context of ensuring food security, increasing
agricultural productivity and protecting health, rather than focusing on the narrower
objective of meeting stringent requirements in export markets. We draw on these cases
to illustrate again our basic points, that the scope of reform needed to make development
sense of the WTO agreement's standards is broad, and that implementation will cost
money.
Broad scope
One SPS-related project that the Bank has supported, an export reform project in
Argentina, did have as its objective to improve trade performance. The project is
described in some detail in Annex B, we list here only those components that relate
directly to implementation of SPS standards:
*  Upgrading veterinary services, central and field;
*  Laboratories;
*  Quarantine stations;
*  Disease and pest eradication programs;
*  Certification of disease-free and pest-free zones;
*  Training, facilities and equipment for seed certification and registration;
7 The basic metric  of SPS implementation  is risk assessment,  e.g., the risk  of establishment  or spread  of a
disease  or pest. International  conventions  deal with  both  the scientific  method  for measuring  risk and
the appropriate  levels  for regulation. A country  may  adopt other  methods  or other  levels,  but to apply
such standards  at the border  the WTO  agreement  places  on the country  the burden  of demonstrating
their scientific  merit and appropriateness.
15*  Training, facilities and equipment for quality control, for certification to ensure the
absence of chemical residues in exported meat;
*  Laboratory to bring wool certification up to international standards;
*  Staff, equipment for research aimed at reducing chemical residues.
Perhaps the critical element of the program was to gain international recognition
of certain zones as disease free or pest free. Argentina's meat, fruit and vegetable exports
have been limited by other countries' concerns over the presence particularly of foot and
mouth disease and citrus canker.  In addition, the program recognized that diversification
into higher value-added exports such as processed meats, seeds, and horticultural
products required producers to meet more stringent quality control standards.  The project
included also several "economic" components, e.g., market research, export promotion,
marketing information systems.
Cost
The following table lists the costs of several SPS-related projects that the World
Bank has supported.  In addition to such costs to the government, producers in the private
sector bear other costs of complying with SPS regulations: vaccinating livestock,
eliminating pesticide residues, guaranteeing sanitary food processing conditions, and the
like.
Country  Project description  Cost
Argentina, 1991-1996  General agricultural export reform  $82.7 million
project
Brazil, 1987-1994  Livestock disease control project  $108 million
Algeria, 1988-1990  Locust Control project  $112 million
Vietnam, 1994-1997  Pest management component of  $3.5 million
Agricultural Rehabilitation project
Madagascar, 1980-1988  Livestock vaccination component of  $11.8 million
Rural Development project
Hungary, 1985-1991  Slaughterhouse modernization  $41.2 million
component of Integrated Livestock
Industry project
Russia, 1992-1995  Improve food processing facilities,  $150 million
disease  control - component  of
Rehabilitation Loan
Poland, 1990-1995  Food processing facilities modernization  $71 million
component of Agro-industries Export
Development project
China, 1993-2000  Animal and plant quarantine component  $10.0 million
of Agricultural Support Service project
Turkey, 1992-1999  Modernize laboratories for residue  $3.3 million
control - component  of Agricultural
Research  project
167.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The WTO TRI]Ps  agreement covers the seven main areas of intellectual property:
*  copyright,
*  trademarks,
*  geographical indications,
*  industrial designs,
*  patents,
*  layout designs of integrated circuits,
*  undisclosed information including trade secrets.
In each area, the agreement:
*  specifies minimum standards of protection that governments must provide,'8
*  requires governments to provide procedures to enforce,
*  provides means of dispute settlement.
The minimum standards are similar for each of the seven areas; they cover, in the
instance of patents: 19
*  What is patentable.
*  What rights flow to the owner of a patent - government is obligated to prevent
unauthorized persons from using, selling or importing the patent, the patented
process, the patented product or the product or products directly made from the
patented process.
*  What exceptions to those rights are permissible - e.g., compulsory licensing may be
required, but details guard the right of the patent owner and require that compulsory
licensing not discriminate on the basis of technology nor between domestic
production and imports.
*  How long the protection lasts. 20
18  One critic however argues that "these [are] not 'minimum' standards of intellectual property protection in
the classical sense of the term; rather, they collectively expressed most of the standards of protection
on which the developed counties could agree among themselves. (Reichman, p. 586)
19WTO Guide, pp. 214f.
20 The TRIPs agreement provided the following transition periods:
* developed countries, until 1 January 1996,
* developing countries and transition economies, up to 1 January 2000,
* least developed countries, up to 1 January 2006 - and may be extended on "duly motivated" request
by a least developed country.
Developing countries that at present provide patent protection to processes and not to products, for
example in the food, chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, can delay up to 1 January 2005 the
application of the obligation to protect products. Even here, governments must provide that inventions
made 1995-2004 will be able to gain patent protection after 1 January 2005.
17LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
The TRIPs agreement, like the SPS agreement, builds on standards expressed in
relevant international conventions. The more important of these include:
*  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1967)
*  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971)
*  Rome Convention - the International Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting (1961)
*  Washington Treaty - the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits, sometimes labeled the ICIP Treaty (1989) 1
The TRIPS Agreement obligates members to provide for protection of plant
varieties, either by patent or by an effective sui generis system such as the plant breeder's
rights established in the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV) convention.
EXTENSION OF IPR OBLIGATIONS
The TRIPS Agreement requires each WTO member to adhere to the provisions
(with a few provisions excepted) of such international IPR conventions, whether or not
the member is party to those conventions. This, of itself, is a major extension for many
countries.  For example, the coverage of integrated circuits is an extension for many
countries, including industrial countries. Under TRIPs, WTO members must consider
unlawful - if not authorized by the right-holder - the import, sale, or other commercial
distribution of the integrated circuit design, of integrated circuits containing that design,
and of articles that contain such integrated circuits.
Another example, the Rome Convention that establishes rights of performers,
producers of sound recordings, and broadcasters has few signatories, particularly among
developing countries. The TRIPs agreement 22 creates the obligations on governments
that allow recording companies from one country to attack unauthorized reproduction and
sale of its products within another country.
In addition, the TRIPs agreement in some areas has broader coverage than the
relevant international convention.  It goes beyond, for example, the Berne Convention to
obligate copyright protection for certain computer programs and computerized data
bases, and it provides the first multilateral obligations on industrial designs (e.g., textile
designs).
21 This treaty is not yet in force; having thus far only nine signatories, of which only one has ratified.
22 "Counterfeit" usually refers to goods to which a trademark has been applied without authorization,
"pirated" to goods that infringe copyrights, etc. - such as unauthorized copies of books, CD's or
video-cassette recordings. (ITC, p. 319)
18WIGGLE  ROOM
The enforcement provisions of TRIPs require that a member provide civil as well
as criminal remedies for infringement of intellectual property rights.  They also obligate
members to provide means by which right-holders can obtain the cooperation of customs
authorities to prevent imports of infringing goods. At the same time, the enforcement
provisions are generic enough to apply to varied legal systems.  They attempt to provide a
balance between creating barriers to trade and abuse of procedures, likewise to strike a
balance between the interests of developers and prospective owners of intellectual
property rights and those of users and of society in general, i.e., between legal incentives
to create and the rights of second comers to compete.
While it is impossible to predict how the process of application and interpretation
through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism will play out, a number of legal
experts23  see sufficient "wiggle room" in the agreement so that developing countries
could - within a good faith implementation of their obligations - strike a balance between
the interests of second comers and the need to promote innovation and investment in
innovation that favors second comers. This would likely require a considerable departure
from the balance that has been institutionalized in the industrial countries' intellectual
property rights law.  That balance, many industrial country experts argue, is tipped
toward the interests of commercialized producers of knowledge - tipped past the point of
optimality even for the community of interests that make up industrial country societies. 24
The tendency in these parts of the WTO is however to give the benefit of the
doubt to established standards.  Finding grounds for moving away from established
standards may be particularly difficult in the area of intellectual property rights.  They
are, after all, an existential matter of legal definition, not a scientific matter of empirical
estimation.  On intellectual property rights even more than on SPS, the benefit of the
doubt will rest with systems presently in place in the industrial countries.
HOW TO DO IT
Even for an individual country, it would be nigh on impossible to provide
objective guidelines as to how to strike the optimal balance between legal incentives to
create, and the costs that are thereby incurred by users and potential second-comers.
Systems in place must be defended as the outcome of accepted (e.g., democratic) political
processes, not of scientific calibration. It would be even more difficult to scale this
balance to different levels of economic development. Analysts have so far built up little
23 Reichman,  1998,  and references  cited there.
24 In preparing  this  paper, we have  come  across  a number  of authors  who argue that  the balance  currently
institutionalized  in industrial  countries  is not the socially  optimal  one even  for these  countries.
Reichman  for  example  urges  that  "the logical  course  of action  for the developing  countries  in
implementing  their  obligations  under  the TRIPs  Agreement  is to shoulder  the pro-competitive  mantle
that the developed countries have increasingly abandoned. (p. 589) Templeman argues that there is
no public justification for the level of intellectual property rights defined by industrial countries' laws.
19knowledge of the impacts of various forms of intellectual property rights on economic
development, even less about different degrees of any form.
With regard to bringing developing countries' IPR regulations to the standards of
the WTO agreement, the World Bank and UNCTAD case studies that we reviewed found
considerable differences from country to country in the degree and the nature of needed
reform. Our review of World Bank and UNCTAD case studies in support of IPR reform
in developing countries likewise provided us with little insight into how to calibrate the
appropriate balance. While the UNCTAD studies are prospective cost estimates, the
World Bank examples are actual projects, in each of which the government had decided
that the money spent to augment intellectual property rights systems would be money
well spent. We might thus conclude that the optimal level of IPR protection in these
countries is above the initial level, though perhaps less than what would be delivered by
an unquestioning imitation of systems in place in industrial countries.
Our review of case studies in support of IPR again shows a considerable range of
needed reforms; drafting new legislation, (e.g., to extend IPR protection to plant
varieties), augmenting administrative structures (e.g., capacity to review applications,
including computerized information systems and extensive training for staff) and
buttressing enforcement.  The technical complexity and specificity of many IPR issues
means that judges, customs officials and others involved in enforcing IPRs may require
additional training.
World Bank Projects
Country  Project description  Cost
Brazil, 1997-2002  Train staff administering IPR laws - $4.0 million
component of Science and Technology
Reform project
Indonesia, 1997-2003  Improve IPR regulatory framework - $14.7 million
component of Information Infrastructure
Development project
Mexico, 1992-1996  Established agency to implement  $32.1 million
industrial  property  laws - component  of
Science and Technology Infrastructure
project
25 Abbott (p. 501) in his introduction and summing-up to an issue of the Journal of International Economic
Law devoted to TRIPs, notes this lack of understanding of the impact of IPR on  economic
development.
20UNCTAD Case Studies 26
Country  Reforms needed  Cost




Chile  Draft new laws, train staff administering  $718,000 one-
IPR laws  time plus
$837,000
annually
Egypt  Train staff administering IPR laws  $1.8 million
India  Modernize patent office  $5.9 million
Tanzania  Draft new laws, develop enforcement  $1.0-1.5
capability  million
26UNCTAD,  The TRIPS  Agreement  and Developing  Countries,  UNCTAD/ITE/1  (1996).
218.  CONCLUSIONS
The major lessons we draw from our review are listed and explained in this
section.
REFORM IS NEEDED
In the areas we have covered, customs administration, sanitary and phytosanitary
standards and intellectual property rights, we found no shortage of projects to review.
Developing countries are willing to borrow money to finance improvements in these
areas; hence it is evident that they, themselves, see a need for reform. "Not to reform" is
an untenable option; questions about implementation are questions of priorities, of
method and of ownership-motivation.
DELAY IS NOT AN ASSET
We should be careful not to be lulled into the ethic of a reciprocal negotiation in
which delay, of itself, is a victory.  As we have already stated several times, the less
developed economies need improvements in the areas that are new to the WTO - to delay
these improvements is to lengthen the time that the people in these countries remain poor.
Time will be needed for implementation, but implementation periods should be based on
the engineering requirements to accomplish the required construction, not handed out as
second prize in a tough negotiation.
SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS
For the advanced countries whose systems are compatible with international
conventions  (or vice versa)  the WTO  brings  no more than  an obligation  to apply their
domestic regulations fairly at the border.  This includes not discriminating among
transactions involving different countries and not unnecessarily impeding international
transactions.
Countries that at present apply their own indigenous standards, have the
additional - and far larger - obligation to apply the internationally sanctioned standards
in their domestic economies.  Though new WTO areas, e.g., SPS, intellectual property
rights, aim at the trade-related aspects of their subject matter, for the least developed
countries they require first the establishment of such systems - or the conversion of
indigenous systems - to the system recognized by international conventions.
Staying with an indigenous system is not a real alternative. In defending trade-
related actions, the systems recognized by international conventions have the legal
benefit of the doubt, an indigenous system must prove itself.  The least developed
countries do not have the resources needed to do that; hence the only effective option for
a country that retains an indigenous system of standards is not to apply standards at the
border. 2 The WTO's free rider problem has not gone away, it has been swapped for a
2 7We are not arguing  here that the iron fist imposes  the wrong  standards.  Our concern  is to remove  the
velvet  glove  of comforting  rhetoric  from that  fist.
22forced rider problem, its burden shifted from the industrial countries to the least
developed countries.
DO IT MY WAY
The content of the obligations imposed by the WTO agreements on customs
valuation, intellectual property rights and SPS can be characterized as the advanced
countries saying to the others, Do it my way! The customs valuation agreement and
TREPs  are explicit on this and while the SPS agreement appears to allow the retention of
an indigenous system, doing so is not a real alternative.
INAPPROPRIATE DIAGNOSIS AND INAPPROPRIATE REMEDY
One effect of this "Do it my way!" nature of the agreements is to intensify the
ownership problem, discussed below.  In addition, this characteristic brings back our
initial questions.  From a development perspective:
*  Do the WTO agreements appropriately identify the problems faced by developing
countries?
*  Given the least developed countries' needs and their resource bases, do the
agreements provide the most effective remedy?
The customs valuation agreement, we have argued above, provides neither
appropriate diagnosis nor appropriate remedy. It addresses only a small part of least
developed countries' problems with customs administration and of course provides no
remedy over other parts.  Over the small part of the problem it covers, it provides an
inappropriate remedy, one incompatible with the resources they have at their disposal.
Our conclusions on the intellectual property rights agreement are similar. As to
diagnosis, its focus is not on encouraging innovation or protecting endogenous
technology in developing countries, it is on industrial country enterprises' collecting for
intellectual property on which least developed countries now recognize no obligation to
pay.  The default remedy is to copy industrial country intellectual property law. While
legal scholars point out that the intellectual property agreement allows for the possibility
of adopting intellectual property law that is friendly to users and to second comers, they
point out that the benefit of the doubt is on the side of copying present industrial country
approaches. A major cost of standardizing on the current industrial country example is to
cut off experimentation - the process of developing more appropriate legal approaches in
developing countries. 28
Our review found less significant problems with the SPS agreement. Developing
and industrial countries' interests in food safety are closer together than their interests on
intellectual property rights protection; hence a one-size-fits-all approach is more
appropriate.
28 Matthew  Stillwell  of the Center  for International  Environmental  Law pointed  this  out to me.
23NO OWNERSHIP OF THE REFORMS IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The lack of instinctive ownership of the reforms needed to comply with WTO
obligations will make implementation very difficult, and will likely push governments to
superficial adjustments aimed at avoiding clashes with trading partners. Private and
social sector shareholders were not involved in the creation of these obligations - nor
even the government agencies that will ultimately be responsible for implementation.
How the least developed countries organize their participation in WTO affairs needs
modification; perhaps the WTO process also.
Effective implementation and compliance involves investment-development
projects, but WTO negotiations have not supported examination from this perspective.
The dynamic behind the WTO process has been the export interests of major enterprises
in the advanced trading countries. Development ministries in the advanced countries
frequently complain how hard it is to get their trade ministries to pay attention to
development issues. In the advanced countries, development ministries are junior
partners in making trade policy; at the WTO, the least developed countries have little
capacity to organize and to advance their own interests.
ALLOWING FOR ALTERNATIVES VS. PROVIDING ALTERNATIVES
Each of the three Uruguay Round agreements we have reviewed includes a
promise of assistance to implement.  In addition, each provides for delayed
implementation, and provides also a way for a least developed country to request an
extension beyond the agreement's deadlines. The latter provision might be interpreted as
recognition that the prescribed or default technology included in the agreements might
not be the most suitable for the least developed countries.
Though the agreements allow for the possibility that alternative approaches might
be developed and recognized, they provide no such alternative. As to developing
alternatives, the WTO negotiations are a self-interest propelled process.  Narrowly
interpreted, that places the burden of developing alternatives that are appropriate to least
developed countries' needs and their resources on the least developed countries
themselves.
The international community however is clearly not in a mood to accept that
narrow interpretation. The Integrated Framework for the least developed countries' trade
development is one initiative that has already been launched to improve the capacity of
the least developed countries to respond to opportunities provided by the international
trading system.  We are aware of several ongoing discussions among World Bank
member governments (who are also WTO members) about additional World Bank
involvement.  The Bank already has under way substantial programs to support
developing country participation in upcoming negotiations. The programs have a large
capacity-building component to build up developing country institutions, from which
developing country governments can draw support on issues that might be included in
future negotiations - without the intermediate ion of the Bank, if they want it that way.
We have also initiated a smaller program to build implementation of WTO standards into
"regular" development projects, e.g., SPS as part of a pest control project, TRIPs as part
24of a project to increase the availability of seed varieties.  This program is aimed
particularly at the least developed countries. Its objectives and those of the larger
program to support developing countries in the negotiations include building a sense of
developing country ownership in the required reforms, and to begin to learn something
about how these things look in a development environment - to build the intellectual
capital from which development-enhancing alternative approaches to WTO
implementation can be built and to add to developing countries' capacities to advance
their interests within the WTO mode.
IT COSTS MONEY
The project costs we have presented here provide a first approximation to the
investments needed to implement WTO obligations on SPS, IPR and customs reform. To
gain acceptance for its meat, vegetables and fruits in industrial country markets,
Argentina spent over $80 million to achieve higher levels of plant and animal sanitation.
Hungary spent over $40 million to upgrade the level of sanitation of its slaughterhouses
alone. Mexico spent over $30 million to upgrade intellectual property laws and
enforcement that began at a higher level than are in place in most least developed
countries, customs reform projects can easily cost $20 million.  Those figures, for just
three of the six Uruguay Round Agreements that involve restructuring of domestic
regulations, come to $130 million. 2 9 One hundred thirty million dollars is more than the
annual development budget for seven of the twelve least developed countries for which
we could find a figure for that part of the budget.
FORMULATING DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
In two of the three areas we reviewed, the resulting agreement provides an
inappropriate diagnosis of development problems; inappropriate remedies even for the
problems diagnosed. In no case did the negotiations deal with the costs of the
investments the agreements mandated - not even with how much the costs would be,
much less with the return in that application versus in some alternative use. Our review
suggests then that international trade negotiations are a poor way to take on development
problems.
29  The experiences we have reviewed were in the more advanced developing countries, the costs could be
higher in the least developed countries who will begin further from the required standards.
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2910.  ANNEX A:
MARKET ACCESS LIBERALIZATION
AT THE URUGUAY ROUND
According to conventional wisdom, the developing countries accepted at the
Uruguay Round obligations on intellectual property rights, standards, etc., in exchange
for market access - liberalization by industrial countries on products of particular export
interest to them.  In this section we present a brief review of the outcome of the Uruguay
Round market access negotiations, with particular focus on what the developing countries
gave versus what they got in those negotiations. 30
TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS
At the Uruguay Round, some 130 countries or customs areas agreed to tariff
bindings or reductions.  We summarize these concessions in Table 1. Figures given
there reflect only reductions that resulted from commitments made at the Uruguay Round
negotiations - they do not include so-called ceiling bindings (bindings at rates above
applied rates) nor do they include bindings of unilateral concessions. 3 2 Table 2 provides
a profile of post Uruguay Round rates.
The principal results of the tabulations are that:
*  developing economies' tariff cuts cover approximately the same percentage of
imports,
*  developing economies' tariff cuts are actually deeper.
In addition to the tariff reductions reflected in these tables, a number of developing
countries - e.g., several Latin American countries and India - introduced unilateral
reforms during the 1980 and early 1990s. Finger and Schuknecht calculated that these
30 The topic  is treated  in greater  length  by Finger  and Schuknecht.
31 All  WTO  Members  have submitted  their schedules  of post-UR  bound  rates,  but tabulations  of tariff  cuts
have  been made  only  for some 40 major  participants  (counting  the 14 member  states  of the EU as
one)  that have  contributed  "before"  and "after"  trade  and tariff  data to the WTO's electronic
Integrated  Data  Base. Of the 40, 26 are transition  or developing  countries,  but none of the least
developed  countries  are included.
32 These calculations  of depth  of tariff  cut depart  in two ways  from  the way that the GATT tariff  cuts  are
traditionally  measured.  First,  GATT  tariff cuts  are usually  measured  only over  the import  categories
on which  cuts are made;  e.g., "a 30% cut on 40% of imports"  does not mean  that the tariff,  on
average,  is now 30 percent  lower. It means  that  the tariff is, on average,  .4 x 30%,  or 12  percent
lower. We include "zero  cuts" in our  average. Second,  it is obvious  that a 50 percent  reduction  of a
2% tariff  rate  does not improve  market  access  the same  as cutting  a 40%  rate in half. Taking  this into
account,  we have  calculated  tariff  changes  from  the formula
dT/(l+T)
where  T is the ad valorem  tariff  rate, or ad valorem  equivalent.  From  the perspective  of an exporter,
dT/(l+T) measures  the percentage  by which  she  can reduce  her delivered  price in the importing
country  while  keeping  the net price she collects  (after  the tariff)  the same. This  comes  to less  than I
percent  if a 2% rate  is cut in half, to more  than 14  percent  if a 40% rate is cut in half. We consider,
thus, the formula  dT/(l+T) to provide  the more  appropriate  measure  of market  access  improvement.
30countries have so far bound under the WTO about 2/5 of the total reductions they
introduced.
Table 1: Uruguay Round Tariff Concessions Given and Received
Bindings  Tariff reductions
(percentage of 1989 imports)  Depth of cut
__________  ________________  pre-UR  post-UR  % of imports  (dT/(1 +T)
Tariff Concessions Given - All merchandise
Developed Economies  80  89  30  1.0
Developing  Economies  30  81  29  2.3
All  73  87  30  1.2
Tariff Concessions Received - All merchandise
Develo  ed Economies  _  77  91  36  1.4
Developing Economies  64  78  28  1.0
All  73  87  33  1.3
Bindings  Tariff reductions
(percentage  of  1989 imports)  Depth of cut
Tariff Concessions Given - Industrial goods  pre-UR  post-UR  % of imports  (dT/(1  +T)
Developed Economies  85  92  32  1
Developing Economies  32  84  33  2.7
All  77  91  32  1.3
Bindings  Tariff reductions
__________  ______  (percentage  of  1989 imports)  Depth  of cut
Tariff Concessions Received - Industrial goods  pre-UR  post-UR  % of imports  (dT/(1+T)
Developed  Economies  79  93  37  1.5
Developing  Economies  72  86  36  1.2
All  77  91  37  1.4
Source: Finger and Schuknecht
31Table 2: Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Rates, all merchandise
bound rate,  post-UR bound  applied rate,
average ad  rate above  average ad
valorem  applied ratea  valorem
Developed Economies  _  3.5  19  2.6
Developing Economies  _  25.2  37  13.3
All  |  6.5  22  4.3
aPercentage of 1989  imports.
Source: Finger and Schuknecht
TEXTILES AND CLOTHING
Since the 1930s, developed economies have used negotiated or "voluntary" export
restraints to limit their imports of textiles and clothing.  At the Uruguay Round the
international community decided to put an end to this practice.  The major provision for
eliminating quotas and VERs on textiles and clothing obligates all Members now
applying restrictions sanctioned by the MFA to "integrate into GATT 1994," all textiles
and clothing products - this to be done in four stages, due on January 1, 1995, January
1/1998, January 1, 2002, January 1, 2005; encompassing 16 percent, 17 percent, 18
percent and 49 percent (by 1990 volume) of imports of all specified textiles and clothing
products 33
These percentages do not apply to the volume of imports under restraint  They
refer to all textiles and clothing import categories. As a matter of semantics then, the
operative phrase in the agreement, to integrate into GATT 1994. is better described as
"certifying that a product is clean of restrictions"34  than as "removing MFA restrictions."
The developed economies' policies toward these imports are among their most
restrictive.  Hufbauer and Elliott estimate, for example, that almost 9/10 of the cost to the
US economy of US import restrictions are accounted for by restrictions on imports of
textiles and clothing.  At the same time, textiles and clothing account for more than 20
percent of developing economies' industrial exports; hence there is much to gain all
around from liberalization.
Implementation has proceeded through the first two stages; thus, each importing
country has integrated into GATT 1994 products accounting for at least 33 percent of its
imports.  There have been, however, loud complaints that minimal liberalization has
resulted from this implementation.  The most often voiced complaints are that each
importing Member has weighted its liberalization toward products:
*  that were not under restraint in that country,
33There are also obligations on the product coverage of each stage and on the growth rates of quotas that
remain.
34 Those that would be illegal under GATT 1994.
32*  with little value added or on which developed economies do not have comparative
advantage, e.g., yarns and fabrics rather than clothing,
*  with high tariffs,
*  and that they have overused transitional safeguards or have applied antidumping and
other WTO-legal restrictions disproportionally against textiles and clothing.
As to evidence on each of these, the tabulations in Table 3 - taken from
information notified to the Textiles Monitoring Board - does indicate that importers have
selected items that were not under restriction. The United States, in the initial two stages,
has met its obligation to integrate 33 percent of its textiles and clothing categories into
GATT 1994 in a way that has eliminated only 1 percent of its MFA restrictions.  The EU
has eliminated 7 percent, Canada, 14 percent.  Norway, of the countries in the table, is the
exception. Norway has decided to liberalize more rapidly than the agreement requires. 35
Similarly, this "integration" has been skewed away from products on which the
developing countries have comparative advantage, e.g., few clothing categories, many
categories of sophisticated textiles. 36
If the industrial countries apply similar art to the stage due in 2002, almost all
obligations to remove MFA restrictions will be delayed until 2005- without violating the
letter of the agreement.
Finger and Schuknecht found minimal use of the textiles and clothing agreement
that allows for "transitional safeguards" on products not yet liberalized.  Perhaps because
of the limited liberalization so far, there has been minimal use of other WTO-legal
measures such as safeguards and antidumping on liberalized textiles and clothing
products.
Tariffs on textiles and clothing remain high relative to those on industrial products
generally. However, Uruguay Round tariff cuts on textiles and clothing were relatively
large. Not only were the cuts (measured by dT/(1+T) deeper on textiles and clothing,
they were applied to a larger fraction of imports.
35 WTO document G/C/M123,  p. 23.
36 Finger and Schuknecht, Table TC2.
33Table 3: Numbers of Specific Quota Limits on Textiles and Clothing Imports
Notified and Eliminated in Stages 1 and 2
(Stage 1 plus stage 2 requires integration of 33%, by import volume.)
Notified,  Eliminated in Stages 1
and 2
Member  Number  Number  Percentage
United States  650  8  1
European Union  199  14  7
Canada  205  28  14
Norway  54  46  85
Source: WTO Doc. G/11179,  page 29. Norway G/C/M/23, p.23.
AGRICULTURE
The agriculture negotiations focused on three categories of policy; import
restrictions, domestic support programs, and export subsidy programs.  On import
restrictions, the major objective of the agreement is to establish a "tariffs only" regime -
to eliminate all forms of import restriction other than bound tariff rates.  To do so, all
members were required to "tariffy" - convert to tariffs - their non-tariff import
restrictions.  Developing countries likewise were obligated to remove all agriculture-non-
tariff measures, but had the option to submit ceiling rates on previously unbound tariff
items.  Agreed negotiating modalities called for a certain percentage reduction of the
tariffied items, but these modalities provided sufficient wiggle room for converting NTBs
to tariffs so that a country could, within the modalities, end up with higher protection. 37
In part because of this possibility, the agreement also includes "market access
commitments."  These commit each importer to minimum import volumes, based on
levels of base period imports.
According to the WTO Secretariat, forty countries participated in the tariffication
process which covered (in aggregate) about 22 percent of their tariff lines.38 Finger-
Ingco-Reincke calculations over the IDB show that tariffication covered, by value, just
over one-third of tariffying countries' agriculture imports.
Finger-Ingco-Reincke tabulations reported in Table 4 indicate that the package of
commitments the industrial countries have undertaken on agriculture will reduce
37 The reader should be careful to recognize the difference between the negotiating process through which
legal commitments are agreed and the legal commitments themselves.  The conversion guidelines
were part of the negotiating process.  They likely influenced what tariff rates one Member was willing
to accept from another, but once a Member's schedule of rates was accepted and annexed to GATT
1994, the conversions guidelines became irrelevant. No Member can be taken to the dispute
settlement mechanism on its bound rates being higher than those calculated with the conversion
guidelines.
38 WTO Secretariat (1999), p. 136.
34protection on only about one-fourth of their agriculture imports, and on an even smaller
fraction of the imports on which they previously imposed NTBs. Countries that
converted NTBs to tariffs have, in some cases, posted rates higher than the base year
tariff equivalent of those NTBs. Japan, for example, has announced that beginning in
April 1999 its tariff on rice will be $3.05 per kilo.  International Trade Reporter (1998)
estimates that this rate is equivalent to 1,000 percent, ad valorem.  (This rate applies only
to imports in excess of Japan's minimum access commitment.) Hathaway and Ingco
calculate that Japan's actual base period protection on rice had a tariff equivalent of about
650 percent.
Judging from the sample of countries in the IDB, both developed and developing
economies have now bound virtually 100 percent of their agricultural tariff lines - overall
an expansion of coverage of about two-thirds for the developing economies, one-fourth
for the developed economies.
As to how market access commitments have affected the scope of liberalization.
Hathaway and Ingco (1996, p. 49) estimate that Japan and Korea's minimum access
commitments on rice will result in nearly a million tons per year of new imports, an
expansion of world trade in rice of 7.5 percent over its 1992 level.  Otherwise, they
conclude that "the minimum access commitments will provide relatively little additional
access and even less additional trade," - no more that 0.5 percent for wheat and sugar. (p.
48, 49)
Table 4: Agricultural Products: Uruguay Round Tariff Bindings
Percent of imports  Post-UR bindings
GATT-bound  that reduce
Pre-UR  Post-UR  protectiona
Tariffied products
All economnies  that tariffied  66  100  14
Untariffied products
Developed Economies  7  71  100  35
Developing Economies  37  100  17
Tariffied and untariffied products
Developed Economies  K 72  100  26
Developing Economies  37  100  17
Source: Finger-Ingco-Reincke.
Notes:
a Tariffied products: percentage (by value) of imports with final-UR bound rates (rates that
include reductions) below the tariff equivalent of base period protection.  Untariffied products:
percentage of imports with final-UR bound rates below base period applied rates.
Source: Finger-Ingco-Reincke, Tables G2.
3511.  ANNEX B:
CUSTOMS REFORM EXPERIENCE
IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES
We present in this section a review of customs reform projects in several
countries. This review reinforces one of the arguments we made in the previous section,
that needed reform is much broader than valuation reform. The section in addition
provides information on how much customs reform costs.
ARMENIA
Armenia had to create a customs administration from scratch after the collapse of
the USSR.  Armenia did not initially (after the breakup of the USSR) impose tariffs on
imports - a practice observed in many countries in the early stages of transition from
central planning.  The customs administration's initial responsibility was to collect VAT
and excise taxes on non-FSU imports. In time, the World Bank and IMF recommended
that Armenia begin collecting a low and uniform tariff for revenue purposes. As a newly
independent state, Armenia needed also to develop institutional capacity for collecting
trade statistics.  The World Bank and UNCTAD 39 provided some assistance early on, the
EU currently provides assistance under the TACIS program to aid WTO accession.
Cost
4 0
World Bank lending for customs reform was part of a larger project to support
institutional reform. The cost of the Customs Administration & Trade Facilitation
component of the project was for $1.604 million.
Scope. The customs reform project in Armenia covers development of a new
customs law, staff training and computerization.
LEBANON
Lebanon is currently an observer but not a member of the WTO.
Cost
4 l
The World Bank is supporting customs reform in Lebanon as part of a project for
revenue enhancement and fiscal management. The loan program is scheduled to close in
March 2000.  The customs reform component was projected to cost $3.82 million,
allocated as follows:
39  Wichelen, Martial van, Customs Evaluation Report: Republic of Armenia
40 Memorandum and Recommendation of the President report number P-6014-AM, March 8, 1993.
41 Memorandum and Report to the President report number P-6374-LEB, June 10, 1994.
36Technical Assistance and Advisory  1.36
Services
Training and Workshops  0.25
Equipment Supplies and Materials  1.25
Incremental Operating Costs  0.52
Subtotal Base Cost  3.38
Price and Physical Contingency  0.44
(13%)
Total Cost (million)  $3.82
Technical support would consist of 79 work-months of international consultant
services and 30 months of local consultant services.
Scope
The reform program includes
*  Computerization - including a radio-based communications system for customs
offices and general improvements to office equipment and computers.
*  Valuation procedures
* Clearance Procedures - aimed at simplification
- Tariff Classification - including introduction of the Harmonized System of
classification.
*  Staff Training - general upgrading of skills, particular training in fraud investigation,
valuation, assessment and collection. 120 staff would be trained.
TANZANIA
Tanzania is a member of the WTO.  Customs consultant Bert Cunningham
prepared a report to the Tanzanian Revenue Authority proposing a comprehensive reform
of Tanzanian customs procedures. 42
Cost
The proposal calls for spending $8-10 million over three years. This would cover
technical assistance, training, refurbishment of buildings, new equipment, and
computerization.
Scope
The reform proposal includes
*  Computerization - including ASYCUDA (the UNCTAD customs valuation computer
system), a bonded warehouse inventory control system, the WCO narcotics
interdiction database, a statistical reporting package, and the PSI firm's valuation
database.
42 Bert Cunningham, 'Tanzania:  Strategy and Action Plan to Reform Customs Administration," June 1996.
37*  Valuation procedures - gradually phase out the Brussels Definition of Value (which
uses reference prices) and adopt the WTO system (based on transaction prices).
*  Cargo controls - speed up processing and eliminate fraudulent or incorrect valuation.
*  Building refurbishment - refurbish customs buildings necessary to house ASYCUDA.
*  Administrative reforms - establish a new division responsible for customs valuation
and tariff classification, increase size of auditing and inspection staff, establish
appeals tribunal, develop comprehensive staff training program, reduce discretion
exercised by customs officers.
*  Legislative reforms - rewrite laws to make them consistent with procedures used in
ASYCUDA (including electronic filing), formally accede to the Harmonized System
Convention, increase transparency.
TUNISIA
Tunisia is a member of the WTO.
Cost and Scope 43
The World Bank has just approved an export development loan to Tunisia that
includes a customs modernization component.
New information system  4.3
Customs container scanners  1.6
Customs Training Center  7.08
Equipment for Documentation Center  1.0
Pilot version for electronic manifest  0.06
Equipment and systems integration  2.17
for electronic document
interchange
Total Cost (million)  $16.21
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
The European Union has been assisting ten of the formerly socialist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe with institutional reforms through its Phare Program.  One
component of this is reform of customs laws and procedures, bringing them into
conformity with EU rules.
43 Draft Project Appraisal Document report number 18778-TUN, March 29, 1999.
38Cost  44
The total budget allocated for Phare customs modernization in the ten candidate
countries is 90 million ecus for 1990-97, of which 70 million has been contracted. (At a






Total Contracted (million ecus)  70.25
Scope
Countries differ widely in level of development as well as in experience with
managing customs agencies.  Some countries, such as the Slovenia and the Baltic states,
are newly created states that created customs administrations from scratch. Hungary, on
the other hand, has operated an institute for training customs agents for over a century.
Accordingly, the type of Phare assistance varies widely. Grants to Poland paid for
expensive anti-smuggling equipment while Romania purchased VCRs (for training
videos) with its Phare equipment grants.  Bulgarian programs were exclusively training
and management.
*  Computerization - Establish computerized customs declarations systems in all
countries.
*  Anti-Smuggling Equipment - Provide laboratory and detection equipment for drug
interdiction and other anti-smuggling efforts.  Equipment ranges from x-ray
equipment and gas chromatographs to communications equipment.
*  Management and Staff Training - Train staff in basic management, customs
procedures and computer operations; establish staff training schools.
*  Legal Reforms  - EU candidates must adopt the EU customs code.  Phare assistance
funded translation of laws, training to (re-)write laws that conform with EU codes,
and conduct public information campaigns.
44 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, "Evaluation of the DG IA Programmes: Phare Customs Programmes,"
December 1998. URL: http://europa.eu.int/commudgla/evaluation/phare customs/index.htm
[Accessed June 16, 1999].
3912.  ANNEX  C:
WORLD  BANK  EXPERIENCE  IN SUPPORT  OF
IMPLEMENTATION  OF SPS STANDARDS
The World Bank has assisted many countries in implementing sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations.  Bank projects supporting SPS systems have typically placed
these measures in a general development context of ensuring food security, increasing
agricultural productivity and protecting health, rather than focusing on the narrower
objective of meeting stringent requirements in export markets.  The projects presented in
this section each have components dealing with various parts of the WTO SPS
agreement. The export reform project in Argentina, which we present first, is the only
project reviewed here that focused particularly on improving SPS standards for trade
purposes.  The other cases are divided into three groups, by the major emphasis of the
project: (a) disease control measures, (b) sanitary conditions in food processing, and
(c)upgrading laboratories and quarantine facilities.
AGRICULTURAL EXPORT REFORM IN ARGENTINA 45
A project in Argentina supported by the World Bank and other donors dealt
directly with SPS implementation, although the project predates the WTO SPS
agreement. The primary objective of the project was to promote exports, its scope was a
general upgrading of agricultural and animal husbandry services. Components aimed to
improve sanitary and phytosanitary conditions so that Argentine exports could meet the
standards imposed by importing countries.  Argentina's meat, fruit and vegetable exports
are limited in part by the presence of diseases (e.g., foot and mouth disease and citrus
canker). Diversification into non-traditional (and often higher value-added) exports-
such as processed meats, seeds, and horticultural products-requires  producers to meet
more stringent quality control standards.
The program of technical assistance lasted from 1991 to 1996, and included a
total expenditure of $82.7 million, broken down as follows.
45Report  P-5428-AR,  Memorandum  of the President  for Loan  3297-AR,  Agricultural  Services  and
Institutional  Development  Project.  January  29, 1991.  Report  9138-AR,  Staff Appraisal  Report  for
Loan  3297-AR,  Agricultural  Services  and Institutional  Development  Project.  January  29, 1991.
40Component  Cost 46
Animal Health  20.0




Export Promotion  8.3
Information System  1.2
Project Coordination  5.9
Total Project Cost (millions)  $ 82.7
Animal Health
The objective of this component was to strengthen animal disease control, both to
facilitate exports and to increase domestic production. The specific elements were:
D  Strengthening the National Animal Health Service's (SENASA) central services ($1.5
million);
*  Strengthening SENASA's field services and disease control campaigns ($7.5
million);
*  Constructing a central veterinary laboratory ($10.2 million)
*  Constructing a medium-security animal quarantine station at the Buenos Aires airport
($800,000).
Note that the above do not include disease control costs paid directly by farmers
and ranchers to protect animal health.  At the time the project was prepared (1990),
producers were spending an average of $70-80 million annually to vaccinate against foot
and mouth disease. 47
Phytosanitary Services
The goals were (a) to eradicate pests, allowing fruit exports to be certified as
originating from disease-free zones, and (b) to improve general quality control necessary
to market fruit in export markets.  This component contained financing for:
*  Construction of quarantine stations ($2.0 million);
*  Staff support and construction of office facilities ($5.5 million);
*  Refurbishment of a lab for pesticide residue analysis ($3.0 million);
*  Development of disease-free zones, by setting up quarantine barriers, upgrading
disease monitoring, and conducting campaigns to eradicate citrus canker and fruit
flies ($2.7 million);
46 Figures include physical and price contingency mark-ups.
47 Staff Appraisal Report, p. 5.
41*  Technical assistance and equipment for seed certification and registration.  The
project documents specifically mention the need to meet OECD certification
requirements ($1.0 million).
Fisheries
This component was designed to expand Argentina's fish catch in a rational
manner. Most of the funds ($10.2 million) were allocated to upgrading research ships.
There does not appear to be any element of this related to meeting sanitary standards in
importing countries.
Meat Marketing
This component was designed to upgrade Argentina's capacity to promote meat
exports, primarily by facilitating the marketing of meat in vacuum-packs rather than as
sides.  A secondary goal was to improve domestic meat marketing systems. This
component included financing to:
*  Perform research into quality control and certification to ensure the absence of
chemical residues in exported meat ($1.0 million);
*  Conduct a broad-based study into developing a modern meat classification system
based on cuts of meat ($4.2 million);
C  A domestic meat substitution campaign - promoting poultry, lamb and pork rather
than beef consumption ($2.7 million)
*  Develop information systems to support the government's export marketing
promotion ($200,000);
*  A standard export promotion campaign ($3.0 million).
Agricultural Research
This component financed research into new technologies to facilitate agricultural
exports.  Specifically this component:
*  Established a laboratory to bring wool certification up to international standards ($2.3
million);
*  Remodeled biotechnology laboratories where research into animal and plant diseases
would be conducted ($2.7 million);
*  Recruited staff and purchased equipment for research into post-harvest physiology in
fruits and vegetables, specifically aimed at reducing chemical residues and
developing fungicides to reduce disease during refrigeration ($3.4 million);
*  Constructed forestry research facilities ($1.9 million).
42Non-Traditional Export Promotion
Argentina wants to follow Chile's success with exporting fruits and vegetables
during Northern Hemisphere winter. This component finances generic export promotion
activities, including an export promotion fund that traders could tap into.
Information System. This component financed staff training and upgrading of
some general government computer systems.
Project Coordination.  This component financed the establishment of a
coordinating agency, staff training, buying computers, "ensuring smooth functioning of
established inter-institutional relationships networks," and the like.
IMPROVE DISEASE CONTROL IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Importing countries with stringent sanitary and phytosanitary standards often
require exporters to certify that animal and agricultural products are free of diseases or
were raised in disease-free zones.  The most obvious area of government activity to meet
these standards is upgrading domestic programs for eradicating and controlling diseases,
pests, vectors, etc. This requires, first of all, a nation-wide infrastructure for plant and
animal testing to detect the presence of pests.  Governments then need to conduct or
coordinate campaigns to control the pests that are found, and educate farmers and
ranchers in proper usage of pesticides and veterinary products to prevent the emergence
of pesticide-resistant strains.  Finally, governments need to establish internal quarantine
barriers to maintain pest-free regions within the country.
The lnternational Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) requires countries to
establish "national plant protection organizations" (NPPO). The functions of an NPPO
are to:
*  issue certificates relating to phytosanitary regulations;
*  report outbreaks or spread of pests;
*  inspect and disinfect imported plants;
*  distribute pest control information;
*  conduct plant protection research.
A number of Bank projects have included components for plant and animal
health, particularly in the area of livestock disease control.  The primary objective of
many of these programs is not to meet requirements in export markets, but simply to
improve agricultural productivity and meet domestic food needs.
Brazil Livestock Disease Control Program
Period: 1987-94, Cost: $108 million.
Although a primary objective of the project was to increase production for
domestic consumption, the project documents note that the project would also help
Brazilian meat exporters meet increasingly strict restrictions imposed by importing
countries.  The program contained a number of components:
43*  recruitment and training of staff Department for Animal Health Protection ($22.8
million);
*  training of veterinarians and purchase of equipment for the State Veterinary Services
($31.7 million);
*  recruitment and training of staff for the Department for Animal Health laboratories
($40 million);
*  modernization of equipment and facilities at nine of the seventeen federal laboratories
and at four quarantine stations,
*  development of procedures to monitor chemical residues and prevent accidental virus
escape ($13.9 million).
Staff recruitment and training comprised 86 percent of the projected base cost;
facilities construction and equipment purchases comprised the remaining 14 percent. 48
Algeria Locust Control Program
Period: 1988-90, Cost $112 million.
Most of the expenditure covered by this project ($79.6 million) was to combat a
current locust plague.  Additional components funded equipment to upgrade ongoing
locust control capabilities ($15.9 million) and information gathering and dissemination
systems for a locust surveillance and detection program ($8.2 million). 49
Vietnam Agricultural Rehabilitation Credit
Period: 1994-97, Cost $106.7 million.
The project included a $3.5 million plant protection component, which promoted
the use of integrated pest management and financed the purchase of laboratory equipment
and vehicles for field work.  One objective of this component was to develop a system for
monitoring of pest and disease incidence, provide early warning of outbreaks, and advise
farmers on corrective measures. 50
Madagascar Village Livestock And Rural Development Credit
Period: 1980-88, Cost: $1 1.8 million.
This project was intended to increase meat production and exports through
improvements in animal health.  The main component was technical assistance and the
purchase of equipment and veterinary supplies to support nationwide vaccination
campaigns (of cattle, pigs and poultry). Although the project accomplished the short-
term objective of vaccinating livestock, it failed to promote exports.  FAIFAMA, the
agency established to conduct the campaigns, was dissolved upon completion of the
project, leaving no institutional infrastructure in place to maintain a disease-free
environment. In addition, the EC withdrew the export license granted to the
48 Implementation Completion Report number 17868, May 5, 1998; Staff Appraisal Report number 6724,
June 11, 1987; MOP number P-4598, June 11, 1998.
49 Project Completion Report number 11849, May 5, 1993.
50 Staff Appraisal Report number 12065-VN, December 22, 1993.
44slaughterhouse that FAEFAMA  operated, due to unsanitary conditions and inefficient
management.5 1
IMPROVE SANITARY CONDITIONS IN FOOD PROCESSING
Animals and crops may be raised in disease free zones but subsequently processed
under unsanitary conditions.  Exporting countries need to certify that meat, fruit, plants,
etc., are processed under sanitary conditions to meet requirements set by importing
countries.
Most Bank programs that contain food processing components focus on
increasing food output (more motivated by a concern to increase domestic consumption
rather than to export) and developing rural enterprises rather than improving sanitation
per se.  These objectives overlap to some extent-unsanitary  food processing is wasteful
as well as unhealthful.
Hungary Integrated Livestock Industry Project
Period:  1985-1991, Cost: $41.2 million
The project was designed to increase Hungary's export earnings.  One component
was slaughterhouse modernization: improving the hygienic conditions of meat processing
in line with USDA and EU standards. Equipment for slaughterhouse modernization cost
$41.2 million. 52
Russia Rehabilitation Loan
Period: 1992-95, Cost: $150 million
This loan (the World Bank's first to Russia) contained a component financing
central government purchases of imports to improve food processing and agricultural
production.  The Russian government requested $150 million to purchase imported spare
parts, equipment and materials for food processing and storage of agricultural products,
pesticides, seed-cleaning equipment, and veterinary products.  The primary objective was
to reduce dependence on food imports by improving quality of food processing and
reducing post-harvest waste.  Another objective was to facilitate the emergence of the
private sector (food processing enterprises tended to be smaller and less capital intensive
than most Soviet state-owned enterprises). Purchases made using the loan started in
December 1992 and were completed by February 1995.53
Poland Agroindustries Export Development Project
Period: 1990-95, Cost: $71 million
The project was intended to increase Poland's export earnings.  One component
of this program was $71.0 million allocated to modernizing technology and increasing
51  Project Completion Report number 10128, December 5, 1991; Project Performance Audit Report number
11732, March 3, 1993.
52 Project Completion Report 12621, February 23, 1993, p. 19.
53 MOP Report Number P-5834-RU, July 22,  1992;  Project Completion Report 16300 February 12, 1997.
45capacity in the food processing industry, specifically buildings, equipment and spare
parts for: freezing and processing lines for fruits and vegetables; cold storage facilities;
equipment for processing of ham and meat products.  Many Polish slaughterhouses did
meet USDA approval at the time of the project; the goal of the loan was primarily to
improve productivity and to shift exports into more highly processed agricultural
products. 5 4
UPGRADE LABORATORIES AND QUARANTINE FACILITIES
One component of programs to comply with the SPS Agreement is to develop or
upgrade laboratory and quarantine facilities within the country. This is necessary for
countries that import from countries with weaker standards as well as those that export to
countries with stronger standards.  Below are some examples of Bank programs with
components related to laboratories and quarantine facilities.
China Agricultural Support Service Credit
Period: 1993-2000, Cost $10.0 million
This project was implemented in the 1990s and contained a number of
components related to laboratory and quarantine services. The Animal and Plant
Quarantine Services component aimed to modernize China's plant and animal quarantine
control procedures by rewriting quarantine regulations to conform with international best
practices, establishing a computerized quarantine information system, upgrading eighteen
provincial quarantine laboratories, computerizing the Shenzen quarantine entry points,
and developing a new plant quarantine isolation station. The base cost of this component
was $10 million (out of a total program cost of $238.3 million). The Livestock Field
Services component funded the modernization of a network of veterinary diagnostic
laboratories and purchase of refrigerators and iceboxes for a vaccine distribution system,
and provided technical assistance in the area of animal health and production. The base
cost of this component was $66 million. 55
Turkey Agricultural Research Loan
Period: 1992-99, Cost $77.6 million.
This program was designed to strengthen the overall research and extension
capacity of Turkey.  It included $2.3 million for a residue control program.  This funded a
laboratory program to test and monitor the presence of a variety of chemical residues:
pesticides, fertilizers and growth regulators in horticultural crops; veterinary and
agricultural drugs in animal products; and residues of packaging materials in food.  A
somewhat related component of the loan program was $4.5 million for research into
integrated pest management. The objective of this program was to develop and introduce
54  MOP Report Number P-5 150-POL,  January 5, 1990. Staff Appraisal Report number 71 12-POL, January
3, 1990.
55  MOP/PR number P-5877, January 29, 1993; Staff Appraisal Report number 11 147-CHA,  January 22,
1993.
46biotechnical methods of controlling pests (in citrus, apples, vegetables and potatoes) in
order to reduce the use of chemical pesticides. 56
The Brazilian livestock disease control project mentioned above included a $13.9
million component to upgrade nine laboratories and four quarantine facilities.
56 Staff Appraisal Report number 9890-TU, April 9, 1992.
4713.  ANNEX D:
REFORM EXPERIENCE WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
We present in this annex a review of several intellectual property rights reform
programs that have been supported by the World Bank, along with a summary of several




The World Bank is supporting reform of the administration and protection of
intellectual property rights in Brazil as one component of a broader science and
technology development project.  The project as a whole is intended to stimulate private-
sector R&D spending, which is low compared to that in other emerging markets.  The
ultimate objective of the IPR component is to improve industrial productivity and
competitiveness, especially in export-oriented firms.  It consists primarily of
administrative improvements to support implementation of the new (1996) industrial
property law.
Brazil has signed the Paris, Berne, UPOV (in May 1999) and Rome conventions,
but not the integrated circuits treaty.
Cost. The cost of the IPR component is $4.0 million.
Scope.
*  Staff Training - train staff involved in IPR administration.
*  Administrative reform - develop local agencies that specialize in providing industrial
property technical assistance.
*  Information exchange - disseminate information about the new IPR law and develop
national indicators for trademarks and patents.
Indonesia 58
The World Bank is supporting institutional reforms for the protection of
intellectual property rights in Indonesia as one component of a larger information
infrastructure development project.  In 1997 Indonesia passed new laws to protect
intellectual property rights in support of commitments made under the TRIPS Agreement
and to make Indonesia more attractive to investment by foreign information technology
firms. The IPR component of the Bank project helps develop the legal and regulatory
57 Project Appraisal Document report number 17178-BR, November 26, 1997.
58 Project Appraisal Document report number 17106-IND, October 16, 1997.
48framework necessary to implement these laws.  The ultimate objective of the project is to
enhance private sector supply of information technology services.
Indonesia is a member of the Berne and Paris conventions, but not the UPOV or
Rome conventions, nor has it signed the integrated circuits treaty.
Cost.  The cost of the IPR protection component is $14.7 million.
Scope.
*  Administrative Improvements - create new agency to implement national information
technology strategy; develop better procedures for IPR administration, examination,
and information dissemination.
*  Staff Training - train staff involved in implementation of IPR laws (including
customs officials, policy, judges, prosecutors.
*  Legal Reforms - prepare laws and regulations on integrated circuits (topography),
trademarks, and trade secrets.
Mexico59
As one part of a broader effort to improve research and development, the World
Bank funded a program from 1992-96 to improve intellectual property rights protection
in Mexico. The project as a whole aimed to improve the competitiveness of Mexican
firms (through increased R&D), to attract foreign investment, and to develop institutions
supporting IPR administration and protection.  Specific goals of the IPR component were
to reduce delays in awarding industrial patents and to increase IPR enforcement activities
in support of newly passed industrial property laws.  A Bank review notes that the project
reduced delays in awarding patents, but failed to increase patent awards to Mexican
nationals or to stimulate Mexican R&D spending.
Mexico is a member of the Berne, Paris and UPOV conventions, it has not signed
the integrated circuits treaty.
Cost.  The final cost of the IPR component was $32.1 million, less than the $40.6
million originally budgeted, due to savings in administrative expenses (which comprised
85 percent of the original budget). The automation program and information center were
initially budgeted to cost $1.7 and $2.4 million, respectively.
Scope.
*  Administrative Improvements - established agency to implement the new industrial
property law.
a  Staff Training - trained staff of the patent and trademark office.
*  Computerization - automated patent application process; computerized database of
patent and trademark documents.
*  Enforcement - trained judicial staff, created specialized intellectual property court.
59 Implementation Completion Report number 18763, December 30, 1998. Staff Appraisal Report number
10468-ME, April 30, 1992. Memorandum and Recommendation to the President report number P-
5757-ME, April 30, 1992.
49UNCTAD STUDIES
UNCTAD produced a study in 1996 of reforms necessary to implement the
TRIPS Agreement.60 This included brief case studies of reforms in six countries, listed
below (membership in international conventions as of May 1999).
Bangladesh
Patents, designs and trademarks are protected under existing laws; Bangladesh
has signed the Paris and Berne Conventions, but not the Rome Convention, the UPOV, or
the integrated circuits treaty. UNCTAD notes that the volume of patent, design and
trademark applications is very low, due to the low levels of industrialization and
commercialization of the economy.
Cost.  The estimated one-time cost of drafting new laws is $250,000.  The
estimated annual costs for judicial work, equipment and enforcement measures is over
$1.1 million, excluding staff training costs.
Scope.
•  Administrative Improvements - Assemble an effective administrative framework for
IPRs.
*  Legal Reforms - Bangladesh needs to pass new legislation to bring food products,
plant varieties, and pharmaceuticals under patent protection. New laws are also
needed to extend copyright protection to computer software.
*  Enforcement - Even where there are laws on the books for patent protection, the
judicial, administrative and enforcement mechanisms are nonexistent or weak.
Chile
Chile is a member of the Paris and Berne Conventions, the International Union for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). Chile is not a member of the Rome
Convention or the integrated circuits treaty. The number of patents granted is declining
because the technical complexity of patent claims is overwhelming the patent examiners.
Chile has begun a program to modernize IPR protection.
Cost.  The modernization program is expected to have a one-time cost (for
drafting new laws and initial training) of $718,000 and increased annual cost of $837,000
for recurring personnel costs
Scope.
*  Legal Reforms - draft new laws in areas of database protection, rental rights, and
performers' rights.
*  Administrative Improvements - develop new examination and registration procedures;
recruit new staff.
*  Staff Training -train industrial property and copyright officials.
*  Enforcement - tighten customs procedures; train judges.
60UNCTAD, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, UNCTAD/ITE/1 (1996).
50Egypt
Egypt is a member of the Paris and Berne conventions, and is the only country to
have ratified the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect to Integrated Circuits.
However, Egypt does not provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals, and customs
officials are not fully equipped to undertake monitoring and discovery activities. Egypt is
not a member of the Rome or UPOV conventions. Egypt is conducting a review of
existing laws and administrative procedures
Cost. The estimated costs of some specific reforms are $1 million for staff
training, $192,000 for strengthening judicial system, and $598,000 for recruiting new
patent personnel and purchasing new equipment.
Scope.
*  Administrative Improvements - upgrade administrative framework; develop systems
for disseminating technical information.
*  Staff Training - train staff in virtually all IPR fields.
*  Enforcement - strengthen judicial procedures.
India
There is patent protection for food products, drugs, and chemical inventions but
no patent protection for plants, animals, integrated circuits.  Indian copyright protection is
up to most TRIPS standards, according to the UNCTAD study, as is border enforcement
of IPRs.  Laws concerning border enforcement appear to be up to TRIPS standards.  India
is a member of the Paris and Berne conventions and is one of only nine countries to have
signed the integrated circuits treaty.  India has not signed the Rome or UPOV
conventions.
Cost.  The estimated cost of a three-year program to modernize the patent office is
$5.9 million.  India recently completed a three-year project to modernize the
administrative system used in trademark enforcement. This cost $353,000.
Scope.
*  Computerization - the patent office is undergoing a computerization and training
program to eliminate a backlog of patent applications.
a  Legal Reform - India needs to change patent laws (for industrial designs and
trademarks, and to reverse the burden of proof in patent infringement cases).  Laws
have been introduced but not ratified to expand patent protection for pharmaceuticals
and agro-chemicals.
Malaysia
Malaysia has signed the Paris and Berne conventions, but not the Rome
Convention, UPOV convention, or the integrated circuits treaty.  The Malaysian
government was planning or undertaking several IPR reforms when the UNCTAD case
study was written:
*  The Industrial Design Act was to be reformed in 1997 to facilitate the development of
Malaysian-made goods.
51*  The government established a number of working groups to study how to implement
the TRIPS Agreement.
*  A special enforcement team was established to apprehend and prosecute copyright
infringers.
*  The process of trademark and patent searching was being computerized.
Tanzania
Tanzania currently has laws covering patents, trademarks and copyrights.
However, Tanzania has not signed any of the major international agreements concerning
intellectual property rights protection, including the Paris, Berne and Rome conventions,
the UPOV, and the integrated circuits treaty mentioned in the Uruguay Round. There is
no systematic enforcement of intellectual property laws.
Cost.  The cost of drafting new laws, expanding enforcement capabilities,
strengthening administrative offices, and providing training is estimated to be between $1
million and $1.5 million.
Scope.
*  Legal Reforms - draft and implement new laws covering integrated circuits, trade
secrets, geographical indications, plant varieties and software.
*  Administrative Improvements - expansion and modernization of administrative
offices.
*  Enforcement - judges and customs officials are unaware of IPR requirements.
Generalizations
The UNCTAD concluded that the direct and administrative costs of complying
with the TRIPS Agreement will depend on the country's level of development and state
of existing LPR  institutions.  In general, developing countries will need to introduce
reforms in legislation, administration and enforcement.
Legislation:  the immediate task to comply with the TREPS  Agreement is to
introduce or rewrite laws guaranteeing protection of patents, copyrights, trademarks,
trade secrets, etc., so that these laws comply with the TRIPS Agreement.  In some
countries this will require writing laws which extend protection to new IPRs (e.g., plant
varieties, computer software).  In some cases this will require rewriting laws to specify
the length of patent or copyright protection.
Administration:  As countries expand the number of IPRs receiving protection,
they will also need to expand their administrative apparatus for granting patents,
copyrights and the like. Many countries will need to expand and modernize to
accommodate increased volume of applications for IPRs as their economies industrialize.
Computerization will be necessary to speed up the process of granting IPRs (e.g.,
conducting trademark searches).
Enforcement:  The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO members to provide
effective means of IPR protection.  Judicial systems and enforcement procedures must be
developed or modernized in many countries to comply with this aspect of the TRIPS
Agreement.  The technical complexity of many IPR issues means that judges, customs
52officials and others involved in enforcing IPRs may require additional technical training
that is unnecessary in routine law enforcement matters.
5314.  ANNEX  E:
DEVELOPMENT  BUDGET  INDICATORS,
SELECTED  LOWER  INCOME COUNTRIES
millions of US dollars data are for 1995 unless otherwise noted
Central  Gross  Official  Population
Government  Domestic  Development  (millions)
Capital  Fixed  Assistance
Expenditure  Investment
Budget
Albania (5)  133.8  516.5  185.6  3.25
Bhutan  53.9  141.1  74.1  0.70
Burkina Faso (2)  125.7  559.1  489.9  9.99
Burundi  127.6  72.7  289.0  6.16
Cameroon  88.8  1,155.4  444.5  13.18
Congo, Dem. Rep.  14.9  611.8  195.9  43.85
Ethiopia (1)  128.7  949.9  890.5  56.53
Ghana (2)  183.7  1,365.2  653.6  17.08
India  6,115.3  81,171.5  1,745.7  929.36
Kenya  284.8  1,934.6  735.2  27.22
Lesotho  153.8  708.4  115.0  1.93
Madagascar  189.6  345.8  303.4  13.30
Mongolia  48.2  252.6  212.9  2.45
Nicaragua  205.9  453.3  664.0  4.43
Pakistan  2,161.9  8,447.2  821.6  122.37
Rwanda (1)  106.5  114.1  712.2  6.40
Sierra Leone  33.7  48.5  206.8  4.51
Tanzania (4)  149.6  1,003.7  882.2  29.65
Yemen, Rep.  305.9  770.5  175.2  15.27
Zambia  279.4  476.3  2,035.1  8.98
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999 CD-ROM, IMF Staff Country Report,
Tanzania
Notes:
Countries in italics are least developed countries.
(1) 1992 budget data
(2) 1993 budget data
(3) 1994 budget data
(4) Development Spending rather than capital expenditures; equals total minus recurrent
expenditures.
(5) Gross Domestic Investment rather than Gross Domestic Fixed Investment
54